

Message Text

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TAGS: PARM, UN, GH

SUBJECT: SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT: MILITARY
EXPENDITURE REPORTING AND LIMITATION

REF: ACCRA 3187

1. FOLLOWING ARE ANSWERS EMBASSY MAY CONVEY TO VICTOR
GBEHO OF MFA IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS HE RAISED CONCERNING
ISSUE OF A PILOT TEST OF PROPOSED MILITARY EXPENDITURE
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REPORTING (MER) INSTRUMENT WHICH WILL COME UP AT UNGA
SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT.

2. WITH REFERENCE TO CONDITIONS FOR GHANA'S PARTICIPATION
IN MER PILOT TEST, UNITED STATES BELIEVES THAT PARTICIPATION
BY SMALL BUT DIVERSE GROUP OF STATES, INCLUDING DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES FROM VARIOUS REGIONS, IS AN ESSENTIAL STEP

TOWARD BROADER AND MORE COMPLETE REPORTING AND TOWARD EXPENDITURE LIMITATION AGREEMENTS. THEREFORE IT IS IMPORTANT FOR A FEW KEY COUNTRIES TO TAKE THIS FIRST STEP TOWARD GREATER OPENNESS BY DEMONSTRATING FEASIBILITY OF STANDARD REPORTING FORMAT OR HELPING TO IMPROVE IT. WE DO NOT FEEL THAT DISCLOSURE OF NATIONAL MILITARY EXPENDITURE DATA FOR PURPOSES OF TESTING PROPOSED FORMAT WOULD IMPAIR ANY NATION'S SECURITY. FIELD TRIAL NOW PROPOSED

WOULD NOT REQUIRE ANY COUNTRY TO SUBMIT DATA IT REGARDED AS PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE. MOREOVER, A COUNTRY WOULD ONLY BE ASKED TO PROVIDE DATA FOR SOME RECENT YEAR RATHER THAN CURRENT OR PROJECTED EXPENDITURES. RATHER THAN JEOPARDIZE SECURITY, U.S. BELIEVES, REPORTING WOULD PROMOTE MUTUAL CONFIDENCE AND ENHANCE PROSPECTS FOR ARMS RESTRAINT AND ARMS CONTROL INITIATIVES ON BOTH REGIONAL AND GLOBAL BASIS.

3. WITH REFERENCE TO PARTICIPATION BY OTHER WEST AFRICAN COUNTRIES, WE UNDERSTAND LIBERIA WILL OFFER TO TAKE PART. NIGERIA HAS BEEN ACTIVE IN PREVIOUS UN EXPERTS GROUPS ON SUBJECT. WE DO NOT EXPECT PARTICIPATION IN PILOT STUDY BY ANY EASTERN BLOC STATE AT THIS TIME, ALTHOUGH THERE ARE SIGNS THEY NO LONGER BELIEVE IT IS POSSIBLE TO IGNORE THE GROWING SUPPORT FOR MER. WE BELIEVE THAT ACTIVE DEVELOPING COUNTRY SUPPORT FOR EXPENDITURE LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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REPORTING HOLDS POTENTIAL FOR CHANGING MINDS IN COMMUNIST STATES AND THEREBY ENHANCES PROSPECTS FOR MAJOR POWER ARMS CONTROL. PREVIOUS PROPOSALS FOR REDUCTION OF MILITARY BUDGETS OFFERED BY COMMUNIST STATES HAVE IGNORED PROBLEMS OF DEFINITION, MEASUREMENT AND VERIFICATION. US BELIEVES THAT GREATER DISCLOSURE IS NECESSARY COMPANION TO EFFECTIVE ARMS CONTROL MEASURES AND CANNOT CONCEIVE OF ANY MILITARY EXPENDITURE LIMITATION AGREEMENT IN ITS ABSENCE.

4. WITH RESPECT TO GBEHO QUERY ON DISARMAMENT/DEVELOPMENT LINK, YOU SHOULD MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS. IT IS CORRECT THAT THE UNITED STATES IS UNABLE, FOR THE CONSTITUTIONAL REASONS CITED IN REFTEL, TO COMMIT ITSELF TO AN AUTOMATIC LINK BETWEEN REDUCING ITS MILITARY EXPENDITURES AND INCREASING AID FLOWS. NEVERTHELESS, U.S. CONCURRED WITHOUT RESERVATION IN SENTIMENT EXPRESSED IN UN RES. 32/85 DEALING WITH PILOT TEST OF THE MER INSTRUMENT THAT "PART OF THE RESOURCES RELEASED (BY THE REDUCTION OF MILITARY EXPENDITURES) SHOULD BE UTILIZED FOR SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, PARTICULARLY THAT OF THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES." US IS ACTIVELY SUPPORTING UN STUDY OF

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DISARMAMENT AND DEVELOPMENT (NORDIC STUDY) AND CURRENT PROPOSAL FOR PILOT STUDY OF MILITARY EXPENDITURE REPORTING.

5. REGARDING REDUCED BLAST/ENHANCED RADIATION (RB/ER) NUCLEAR WARHEAD, US AND NATO ALLIES HAVE FOR SOME TIME BEEN CONCERNED BY LARGE AND GROWING DISPARITY BETWEEN NATO AND WARSAW TREATY CONVENTIONAL FORCES DEPLOYED IN CENTRAL EUROPE. FOR EXAMPLE, BALANCE OF TANK FORCES IS NOW ABOUT 3:1 IN FAVOR OF WARSAW PACT. RB/ER WARHEAD WOULD BE PARTICULARLY EFFECTIVE MEANS OF DEFENSE AGAINST ATTACKING ARMOR CONCENTRATIONS IF CONVENTIONAL MEANS FAILED, IN THAT IT COULD BREAK UP AND DESTROY SUCH CONCENTRATIONS WHILE CAUSING LESS COLLATERAL DAMAGE TO LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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ADJACENT POPULATION AND STRUCTURES THAN TACTICAL NUCLEAR WARHEADS CURRENTLY DEPLOYED. PRESIDENT CARTER RECENTLY DECIDED NOT TO PROCEED WITH PRODUCTION OF RB/ER WARHEADS AT THIS TIME AND HAS URGED THE USSR TO RESPOND TO THIS ACT OF RESTRAINT IN SUCH A WAY AS TO ELIMINATE NEED FOR NATO ALLIANCE TO ADDRESS ITS PRODUCTION AND DEPLOYMENT IN THE FUTURE.

FUNDAMENTAL FACT SHOULD BE BORNE IN MIND THAT RB/ER WARHEAD IS NOT A NEW TYPE REPEAT NEW TYPE OF WEAPON OF MASS DESTRUCTION BUT A NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICE. PRESIDENT CARTER HAS EMPHASIZED COMMITMENT OF US TO REDUCING THE NUMBER OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS AND OF ULTIMATELY ELIMINATING THEM ENTIRELY FROM NATIONAL ARSENALS. HOWEVER, US HAS REJECTED AS NOT SERIOUS SOVIET PROPOSAL THAT THIS PARTICULAR TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPON DEVELOPED BY US FOR SPECIFIC DEFENSIVE PURPOSE BE THE SUBJECT OF ISOLATED MUTUAL RENUNCIATION. IN ANSWER TO QUESTION CONCERNING APPROPRIATE SOVIET RESPONSE TO US RESTRAINT ON RB/ER WARHEAD, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE BROWN RECENTLY CITED, AS EXAMPLES, NUMBERS OF WARSAW PACT TANKS AND MEDIUM RANGE MISSILES LIKE SOVIET MOBILE, MIRV'D SS-20 MISSILE NOW BEING DEPLOYED BY USSR.

6. CRUISE MISSILE IS AN UNMANNED SELF-PROPELLED GUIDED MISSILE. IT IS ATTRACTIVE TO US IN STRATEGIC TERMS FOR RETALIATORY DELIVERY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE STRATEGIC BALANCE BETWEEN US & USSR IS NOW RELATIVELY STABLE - ALTHOUGH LEVELS OF FORCES ARE HIGH BY ANY MEASUREMENT; NEITHER SIDE HAS PABILITY TO DESTROY A MAJOR PART OF THE STRATEGIC RETALIATORY FORCES OF THE OTHER. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, NEITHER SIDE CAN HOPE TO ESCAPE DESTRUCTION LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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BY ATTACKING OTHER SIDE'S FORCES. HENCE NEITHER SIDE HAS INCENTIVE TO STRIKE FIRST IN A CRISIS SITUATION. NEW WEAPONS OR INCREASED ACCURACY OF EXISTING WEAPONS COULD THREATEN STRATEGIC STABILITY. THE CRUISE MISSILE, WHICH IS STILL IN DEVELOPMENT, HAS BEEN SELECTED BY THE US GOVERNMENT AS THE MEANS OF MAINTAINING THE EFFECTIVENESS

OF THE BOMBER ELEMENT OF ITS STRATEGIC TRIAD INTO THE 1990S. THIS WAS A CONSCIOUS DECISION ASSOCIATED WITH CONCESSION OF PRODUCTION OF THE B-1 BOMBER. WHILE IT OFFERS PROSPECT OF RELIABILITY OF OPERATION AND ACCURACY, IT IS RELATIVELY LOW-SPEED SYSTEM WHICH WOULD NOT POSE QUESTIONS ABOUT POSSIBLE USE IN A FIRST STRIKE. AS HAS BEEN REPORTED WIDELY, US HAS TAKEN THE INITIATIVE IN SALT II NEGOTIATIONS TO SEEK A SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS. WHILE ONLY LIMITED REDUCTIONS ARE NOW ANTICIPATED FOR SALT II, IN SALT III NEGOTIATIONS AHEAD BOTH SIDES WILL BE COMMITTED TO SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS IN DELIVERY VEHICLES AS WELL AS RESTRICTIONS ON QUALITATIVE CHANGES THAT COULD REDUCE STRATEGIC STABILITY. THE CRUISE MISSILE AT THIS TIME OFFERS GOOD PROSPECTS TO US AS WEAPON THAT CAN CONTRIBUTE TO DETERRENCE WITHOUT RAISING QUESTIONS OF POSSIBLY THREATENING STRATEGIC STABILITY.

7. IF ABOVE CANNOT BE COMMUNICATED PRIOR TO OBEHO'S DEPARTURE FOR NEW YORK FOR SPECIAL SESSION, EMB IS REQUESTED TO SO ADVISE USUN (FOR INFO OF WASHINGTON) SO THAT IT CAN FOLLOW UP. VANCE

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